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Abstract
This study focuses on the role of habit in the process of information use underlying daily travel 
mode choices. Based on the ‘policy capturing’ paradigm, eighty-two students performed a 
multi attribute travel mode judgment task, in which they could use information about travel 
circumstances in order to make a number of judgments. Measures of information use were 
obtained by performing multiple regression analyses for each subject. It was found that habit 
reduced the elaborateness of information use in judgments of travel mode use. This effect was 
independent of effects of manipulated accountability demands.
%
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1. Introduction
Despite the observation that many behaviors are executed on a daily routine basis, the 
greater part of psychological research pursues to explain and understand behaviors that 
people do not perform frequently. As a consequence, decisions to perform a given 
behavior are often considered as being based on reasoned considerations of the good and 
bad consequences of that behavior. Expectancy-value models (see, e.g., Feather, 1982) 
describe how perceptions of these consequences are weighted and combined into a final
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decision. Thus, these models emphasize the deliberate character of individual decision 
making.
Although many routinized decisions may have originated from reasoning, individuals 
do not go through such a deliberate decisional process when they make the same 
decisions over and again (Aarts et al., in press). For instance, Triandis (1980) suggests 
that attitudes (which are supposed to be based on the reasoned considerations of 
performing the behavior) may become irrelevant in guiding behavior when the behavior 
has been performed repeatedly, and has become habitual (see also, Ronis et al., 1989). 
In other words, when the same behavior is performed many times, one does not need to 
weigh pros and cons, or to check one’s attitudes in order to arrive at a choice. When 
habits are formed, subsequent behavior may be associated with, and automatically 
triggered by, the specific situational cues that normally precede it.
The present study focuses on travel mode choice behavior in order to test theoretical 
propositions as to habitual decision making. In particular, we are interested in the role 
of habit in information processing underlying daily travel mode choices. Like many 
behaviors routinely performed in every day life, travel mode decisions are supposed to 
be often made in a rather ‘mindless’, automatic fashion (e.g., Banister, 1978; Goodwin, 
1977; Verplanken et al., 1994). In other words, travel behavior is often habitual.
Generally, psychologists conceptualize habits as the learning of sequences of acts that 
have become automatic responses to certain situations, which may be functional in order 
to achieve a given result, or to obtain specific goals (e.g., James, 1890; Triandis, 1980; 
Ronis et al., 1989; Watson, 1914). Habits are characterized by a goal-directed type of 
automaticity; habitual behaviors are instigated by a specific goal-directed state of mind 
in the presence of triggering stimulus cues, for instance kissing one’s spouse when 
coming home from work, or as in the present context, taking the bicycle to travel to the 
university. Once evoked by the very goal to act, decisions on courses of actions and 
their subsequent execution may be enacted without much deliberation, and are therefore 
relatively independent of reasoned considerations. Thus, travel mode choice habit may 
be conceived of as the rather automatic and immediate activation of the habitual travel 
mode option upon the instigation of the goal to travel (cf. Bargh and Gollwitzer, 1994).
Research carried out in the last two decades in a variety of domains has witnessed the 
importance of the habit concept in the explanation of repeated behaviors. Several studies 
have demonstrated that a measure of past behavior or habit predicts repeated behavior 
along with traditional predictors, such as attitudes (see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). 
Furthermore, there are a still growing number of studies that empirically corroborate the 
idea that habit and attitudes interact in the prediction of later decisions, i.e. attitudes are 
less predictive of behavior as habit increases in strength (e.g., Mittal, 1988; Montano 
and Taplin, 1991; Verplanken et al., 1994; cf. Triandis, 1980).
Theoretically, the relations between attitude, habit and later behavior, as discussed 
above, suggest that the decisional process underlying behavioral decisions is less 
elaborate as habit increases in strength. That is, when habit is strong, cognitive efforts 
may be reduced to a minimum, as incoming informational cues relevant for the decision 
to perform the behavior may be less scrutinized before individuals make a decision. 
Returning to the case of travel mode choice: the habitually used travel mode (e.g., 
bicycle) is capable of being immediately activated upon the instigation of a specific goal
H. Aarts et a l./  Acta Psychologica 96 (1997) 1-14 3
to travel (e.g., having to go to the university), without the need to ponder on the details 
of the trip. However, we rarely use a particular mode for one purpose only, but instead, 
may use the same mode of transportation repeatedly in a variety of circumstances and 
for many different travel goals. By the same token, that travel mode may be habitually 
used for all sort of trips, and thus immediately chosen upon the mere incitement of any 
goal to travel. One might say, therefore, that the habit of using a particular mode of 
transport is generalized across situations (Aarts, 1996; Verplanken et al., 1994), and the 
need to distinguish between travel purposes and circumstances may diminish (cf. the 
concept of stimulus generalization in learning theory, Hull, 1943). In the field of 
consumer choice behavior it is well recognized that repeated purchase behavior may be 
habitual under quite different circumstances (e.g., ordering the same drink, irrespective 
of the bar where you are), which is characterized by a limited process of information use 
in decision making (e.g., Engel et al., 1993).
However, to our knowledge, there is little research that has actually examined the 
process of information use that accompanies habitual decisions. Therefore, the present 
study investigates the effects of habit on information processing during judgments of 
travel mode use.
1.1. Habit and the use of information
One way to investigate decision makers’ strategies of information use was to present 
them with choice options that systematically vary on a number of attributes to measure 
their evaluations of the options. One may subsequently infer decision strategies by 
means of multiple regression analyses based on within-subjects information -  evaluation 
covariations. This paradigm is known as policy capturing (Brehmer and Joyce, 1988). 
The values of the attributes that are systematically varied yield a set of attribute 
combinations, which are referred to as profiles. In our case, the evaluation of using a 
travel mode for a specific travel goal consisted of attributes about the circumstances 
under which the journey is made, i.e., travel distance, departure time, weight of luggage, 
and weather conditions. A travel situation might be described, for example, as a distance 
over 2.5 kilometers, departure time at 9:00 a.m., weight of luggage of 4 kilograms, and 
rain. Given a sufficient number of different travel situations to be judged, a linear 
regression analysis can be performed for each individual to describe the relation between 
the informational input (attributes) and the judgments.
These regression analyses reveal for example how consistentiy the information is 
processed [as indicated by the proportion of variance ( R 2) in a subject’s judgments 
accounted for by a linear combination of the attributes], or which attributes are used for 
the evaluations of options (as indicated by the significance of their beta weights). The 
obtained beta weights represent the relative importance of attributes for a subject’s 
judgments. A beta weight thus reflects the extent to which a judge has taken into 
account the value of that attribute in making the judgments. In short, the researcher 
attempts to draw inferences regarding the strategy the subject adopted in utilizing the 
presented informational cues on the basis of the latter’s predictive value. The policy 
capturing paradigm has been applied to a variety of judgment tasks in many application 
fields (see for an overview Brehmer and Joyce, 1988).
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For the present purpose, the number of cues used by a subject might be employed as 
a measure of cognitive effort or information use (e.g., Weldon and Gargano, 1988). A 
larger number of significant beta weights is indicative of relatively extensive informa­
tion processing strategies. However, the number of significant beta weights may reflect 
different psychological aspects, for the measure may be related to other statistical 
features that can be derived from the regression analysis. That is, there may be 
distinctive cognitive processes that operate during decision making and affect the 
number of significant beta weights associated with the attributes. One possible reason 
has to do with consistency of attribute information processing. Higher levels of 
consistency ( R2) increase the accuracy of prediction, and thus the probability of 
significance of beta weights. Another, for the present purpose more relevant possibility 
concerns the extent to which subjects allocate equal importance to attributes, that is the 
subject’s sensitivity to a broad range of potentially relevant trip-related cues. Taking the 
attributes more equally into account enhances the number of significant beta weights, 
basically because, other things being equal, the subject focuses on more attributes. 
Conversely, selective or unequal allocation of importance to attributes (or, taking less 
attributes into account) reduces the number of significant beta weights. Therefore, to 
scrutinize the process of information use in more detail, both consistency of information 
use and the equality of allocation of importance to attributes are used as complementary 
measures of information use.
In line with previous findings concerning the effects of habit on repeated decision 
making, it is the purpose of this study to test the hypothesis that habit is negatively 
related to the elaborateness of information processing preceding judgments of travel 
mode use. This study focused on the judgment of bicycle use for short distance trips. It 
is expected that individuals who have developed a strong bicycle choice habit apply less 
elaborate information processing strategies compared to those who have not developed 
such a habit.
Habit can be considered as a person-related, stable factor, which affects the decision
making process on a recurrent basis. That is, once habits toward a particular behavior
are formed, individuals will engage in minimal information processing each time when
they encounter comparable situations that call for the same behavior. However, the
depth of the decision making process may be also contingent on situational factors, for
example, when the decision has significant consequences for the individual. For that
reason, it seems conceivable that even people with strong habits may occasionally be
motivated to base their decisions on relatively more extensive information processing. In
the present study an attempt is made to experimentally enhance the depth of information
processing that underlies travel mode choices by introducing situation-specific demands.
This was done by manipulating perceived accountability for one’s judgments. It is
assumed that accountability motivates people to scrutinize informational input for its
relevance to their judgment task in order to appear logical and thoughtful (e.g., Tetlock,
1985; Weldon and Gargano, 1988). We expect that both habit and accountability would
be related to the process of information use, i.e. habit is expected to lead to less
elaborate information processing, while accountability is expected to enhance the depth 
of information use.
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2. Method
2.7. Subjects and design
Subjects were 82 students of the University of Nijmegen. Because their task was to 
evaluate the usefulness of the bicycle in different travel situations, only subjects who 
owned a bicycle were recruited. Subjects received Dfl. 7.50 for their participation. The 
design of the experiment is a 2 (Habit: strong versus weak) X 2 (Accountability: 
accountable versus not accountable) between-subjects design. ANOVAs were conducted 
according to this design. Subjects were randomly assigned to the accountability condi­
tions.
2.2. The measurement o f  bicycle choice habit
Habit of bicycle use was measured by a method used in previous studies (see, Aarts, 
1996; Verplanken et aL, 1994, Verplanken et al., in press). Subjects were presented with 
9 globally described trips (e.g., ‘Going shopping to a supermarket’, ‘Visiting friends’), 
and were required to mention for each trip as quickly as possible the first mode of 
transportation that came to mind as the one they would use from four alternatives, i.e. 
walking, bicycle, train, and bus. The trips were randomly presented. It should be noted 
that the present instrument assesses the extent to which habit is generalized, rather than a 
goal (or trip) specific habit. The rationale underlying this operationalization is the 
assumption that habitual responses are guided by retrieved mental representations of past 
travel behavior (cf. schemas or scripts; Abelson, 1981). That is, when for example an 
individual habitually chooses and uses the bicycle for a great variety of travel goals, by 
the principle of associative learning, these travel goals may become capable of activating 
bicycle use automatically (Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 1995; cf. Bargh and Gollwitzer, 
1994). The imposed time pressure and the instruction to respond with the choice that 
immediately comes to mind may further facilitate the automatic nature of responding 
and the reliance on cognitively available structures (Kruglanski and Freund, 1983). 
When the general habit of bicycle choice is strong, the choice of bicycle as travel mode 
may constitute a dominant element in the mental representations of travel behavior, 
which is supposed to be reflected in a relatively large number of bicycle choices across 
the presented journeys. Hence the frequency of mentioning the bicycle served as a 
measure of general habit for choosing the bike; the habit measure thus varies from 0 to 
9. The mean score across the sample was 5.06, sd =  1.44.
The sizable correlation between the measure of general bicycle habit and an index of 
choice variability [computed as: y T X ^ )2, where is the frequency of mentioning each 
possible mode option across the 9 trips in the habit measure], r —0.89, p <  0.001, 
suggests that a strong bike habit is associated with a high level of invariance across the 
presented trips (i.e., subjects chose the bike fairly invariantly), whereas a weak bike 
habit is reflected in a high variability of travel mode choices. In other words, when 
general habit of bicycle use increases in strength, that mode is tend to be chosen 
irrespective of the travel goal. Conversely, as general bike habit decreases in strength,
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subjects exhibit a more variable mobility pattern across the presented travel goals. This 
means that, at least in the present study, a weak bicycle habit tends to coincide with the 
absence of a specific travel mode habit rather than with the presence of another, 
competing, travel mode habit.
Furthermore, inspection of the distribution of the habit measure revealed a skewness 
to the left (skewness — —0.59). Only 5 subjects (6%) mentioned less than 2 times 
‘bicycle’. Given the a priori chance expectation of choosing a particular mode, i.e. 2.25 
(9 trips/4  alternatives), these results suggest that lower scores on the habit measure 
indicate a relatively weak general habit of bicycle use, rather than a general habit of not 
using the bike. On the basis of a median split of the measure of bicycle habit subjects 
were categorized as weak, or strong concerning bicycle choice habit.
The habit measure has been used and validated in a study on commuters’ car choice 
behavior concerning innercity job trips (Aarts, 1996). The results of this study showed 
that the habit measure (which was used to assess car use habit) correlates substantially 
with self-reported frequency of past car use in general ( r  =  0 .66 ; p <  0 .001), i.e. an 
important determinant of habit strength (Triandis, 1980). In addition, the habit measure 
could be differentiated from general preference or attitude toward car use, as indicated 
by a relatively low correlation between the two (r  =  0.32; ns). Furthermore, the measure 
satisfactorily predicted the frequency of car use for commuting to one’s job over a five 
days period ( r  — 0.60, p <  0 .001), even when the measure was controlled for respon­
dents’ attitude toward using the car. Moreover, a sizable test-retest correlation over a 4 
months period reveals the reliability of the habit measure ( r  =  0.92; p  < 0.001). In sum, 
these findings suggest that the habit measure satisfies the criterion of both validity and 
reliability.
2.3. Procedure and task
The experiment was run on computers. Subjects worked in separate cubicles. First, 
habit of bicycle use was measured, which was followed by an unrelated fillertask to 
familiarize subjects with the computer and handling the ‘mouse’. Subsequently, subjects 
received a description of the travel mode judgment task in which they learned to respond 
to a series of travel situations concerning the goal of picking up some goods somewhere 
and turning back. After instructions for the task, the experimental manipulations of 
accountability were implemented. Half of the subjects were told that they had to explain 
their judgments at the end of the experimental session to the researchers conducting the 
study. Subjects were then presented with the travel mode judgment task. For each travel 
situation subjects read the description of a travel situation and indicated their judgment 
of the favorability of using the bicycle in that particular situation. After the judgment 
task they responded to a manipulation check and were debriefed.
2.4. Stimulus material
The stimuli consisted of 16 descriptions of travel situations. Each situation was 
described with four attributes, each of which could have two values, i.e., weather
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conditions (rain, no rain), weight of luggage (4 kilograms, 20 kilograms), departure time 
(9:00 a.m., 2:00 p.m.) and distance (one way) to the destination (2.5 kilometers, 5 
kilometers). The values were combined across the attributes according to a fully 
balanced design, resulting in the construction of 16 travel situations. In this particular 
design the attributes are uncorrelated. Multiple linear regression analyses will therefore 
yield direct estimates of attribute use. The order of presentation of attributes was varied. 
For half of the subjects the order in which the attributes were presented was: weather, 
weight, departure time, and distance, whereas the order for other subjects was: departure 
time, distance, weather, and weight. The 16 travel situation descriptions were randomly 
presented.
2.5. Dependent measures of information use
Subjects indicated their favorability of using the bicycle in each travel situation on a 
10-point scale ranging from ‘unfavorable’ ( l )  to ‘favorable’ ( 10).
Three characteristics were assumed to reflect aspects of the process of information 
use: (1) the number of attributes used; (2) the consistency concerning the processing of 
attributes; and (3) the extent to which equal importance is allocated to attributes. All 
indices were obtained by two steps. First we performed a linear multiple regression 
analysis across the 16 judgments for each subject. In these analyses subjects’ judgments 
of favorability of bicycle use were regressed on the attribute values (coded 1 or 2), as is 
the usual procedure in this paradigm. The obtained beta weights represent the direct 
contribution of each attribute in subjects’ judgments across the 16 trips. Moreover, the 
significance of a beta weight indicates whether the attribute was actually used, There­
fore, a measure of the number of attributes used is represented by the number of 
significant beta weights, which may thus vary between 0 and 4.
The proportion of variance in each subject’s judgments accounted for by the four 
attributes ( R2) may serve as a measure of consistency of information use. When R2 is 
large, there is little variance in the judgments that cannot be explained by a linear 
combination of the attributes.
Next, we calculated the standard deviation of the relative beta weights, which can be 
interpreted as the extent to which subjects allocate equal importance to the attributes. It 
should be noted that, contrary to the number of attributes used, the measure of the 
standard deviation of relative beta weights involves all beta weights, and not only 
significant ones. Procedurally, first the relative beta weights were computed as the ratio 
of the absolute beta weight for each attribute to the sum of absolute beta weights across 
all four attributes. Since the sum of the relative beta weights is one, each beta weight 
reflects the relative importance allocated to the respective attributes. Theoretically, when 
subjects weight the attributes as equally important the standard deviation is 0 , and the 
relative beta weights are 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25. W hen subjects weight the attributes 
differently in importance, the standard deviation is high. In the extreme case the 
standard deviation is 0.5, and the relative beta weights are, for example, 1, 0, 0, 0 (one 
attribute is given all weight). A low value of the standard deviation therefore implies a 
relatively equal allocation of importance, whereas a high value of standard deviation 
reflects unequal or selective allocation of importance.
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In the introduction section it was argued that the number of attributes used may be 
affected by consistency of information use and the equality of allocation of importance 
to attributes. Pearson correlations showed that the measures of R2 and standard 
deviation of relative beta weights indeed significantly correlated with the number of 
significant beta weights, correlations being 0.37, p <  0.001, and —0.48, p <  0.001, 
respectively. These results thus suggest that when both the level of consistency and 
equality of allocation of importance to attributes increases, so does the number of 
attributes used.
3. Results
3.L Manipulation check
As a check on the accountability manipulation, subjects were asked to respond to the 
question: “ To what extent did you feel a need to make judgments that you could 
explain?'’ Responses were given at an 11-point scale ranging from 4‘not at all” (1) to 
“ very strongly’’ (11). Responses to the manipulation check suggested that accountable 
subjects felt a stronger need to explain their judgments (m =  6 .11) than not-accountable
subjects On =  4.55), ¿(78) — 2.82, p <  0 .01.
3.2. The use of information
Table 1 presents an overview of the means and standard deviations for the dependent 
measures for each cell in the design.
As Table 1 shows, on average the highest beta weight was obtained for weather 
conditions, followed by weight of luggage, distance and time of departure. On average 
2.0 beta weights were significant. According to the average number of significant beta 
weights of the four attributes 92% of the subjects used information about the weather
Table 1
Means and standard deviations (between parentheses) for dependent variables by habit and accountability
Weak habit Strong habit Grand mean
Not account. Account. Not account. Account.
Beta weights for
Weather 0.57 (0.24) 0.63 (0.20) 0.63 (0.18) 0.56 (0.30) 0.60 (0.23)
Weight 0.37 (0.27) 0.42 (0.20) 0.36 (0.27) 0.46 (0.31) 0.40 (0.26)
Distance 0.23(0.17) 0.28 (0.14) 0.22 (0.19) 0.17 (0.16) 0.23(0.17)
Departure time 0.14(0.10) 0.09 (0.07) 0.09 (0.08) 0.10(0.07) 0.10(0.08)
Number of significant beta's 1.91 (0.89) 2.42 (0.65) 1.71 (0.46) 1.88 (0.62) 2.00 (0.72)
R2: explained variance 0.70(0.16) 0.76 (0.10) 0.72(0.11) 0.77(0.15) 0.74(0.13)
Standard deviation betas 0.22 (0.09) 0.20 (0.05) 0.24 (0.04) 0.26 (0.07) 0.23 (0.07)
Mean judgment of favorability 6.40(1.42) 5.21 (1.65) 6.90 (1.58) 6.33 (1.33) 6.17(1.62)
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conditions, 68% about the weight of the luggage, and 38% about the distance. 
Information about departure time was virtually not considered (2%). Inspection of the 
size of beta weights and their significance thus showed the same pattern of results as to 
the order of importance.
In an analysis of variance on the number of significant beta weights, the main effects 
of Habit and Accountability were both significant. W eak habit subjects used more 
attributes than strong habit subjects, F (l,78) =  5.64, p <  0.03 (mean scores respectively 
2.18 and 1.78). Accountable subjects used more attributes than subjects who were not 
held accountable, F (l,78) =  5.58, p  <  0.03 (mean scores respectively 2.20 and 1.81). 
The effects of habit and accountability on the number of attributes used were indepen­
dent, as was indicated by a non-significant interaction, F (l,78 ) — 1.35, ns.
For accountable subjects R 2 was slightly higher than for not-accountable subjects, as 
was established by a marginal significant main effect, F (l,78 ) =  3.68, p  < 0.06 (mean 
scores respectively 0.77 and 0.71), In the policy capturing paradigm, a larger R2 is 
interpreted as indicating more consistent information processing. These results thus 
suggest that accountable subjects were more consistent information processors. There 
was no significant effect of Habit, F (l,7 8 ) =  0.24, ns, and no significant interaction, 
F(l,78) =  0.09, ns (overall M  =  0.74; sd — 0.13). It may be argued, however, that a low 
R2 does not necessarily imply that judges are inconsistent, but that they employ a 
strategy which cannot be captured by a linear additive model (Brehmer, 1994; Stewart, 
1988). For instance, the effect of one attribute on an individual’s judgment may depend 
on the specific level of a second attribute (i.e., the two attributes interact in the 
prediction of the judgments). Such strategy is described as noncompensatory, and can be 
measured by testing whether the increment in R 2 is significant when the interactions 
among attributes are added to the regression model (cf. Stone-Romero and Anderson, 
1994). In order to test whether accountability is related to such an increment in R 2, for 
each subject all first-order interactions among attributes were added to the original 
predictors (i.e., main effects) in the regression analysis. However, simple f-test revealed 
no significant increment in R 2 due to accountability. Moreover, using a measure of total 
explained variance (i.e., adding the R 2 of interaction terms to the R 2 of main effects) in 
the analyses of variance yielded exactly the same pattern of results.
Concerning the standard deviation of the relative beta weights, the results of the 
analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect of Habit. The standard deviation 
was lower for weak habit subjects than for strong habit subjects, F (l,78 ) =  6.52, 
p  < 0.02 (mean scores respectively 0.21 versus 0.25). This suggests that weak habit 
subjects divided their allocation of importance more equally across attributes compared 
to strong habit subjects, who were more selective in using the cues. No significant main 
effect of Accountability, F (l,78) =  0.07, ns, and no significant interaction, F (l,78 ) =  
1.97, ns, was found on the standard deviation (overall M  =  0.23; sd  =  0.07).
The above pattern of results suggests that the effects of habit and accountability on 
the number of attributes used may have been produced by different processes, especially 
since no significant interaction was found on the dependent measures. Specifically, 
accountability may enhance the number of significant beta weights, due to an increase in 
consistency, whereas the effects of habit on the number of significant beta weights may 
be caused by a decrease (higher standard deviation) in equality of allocation of
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importance to attributes. Recall that the measures of consistency and equality were both 
significantiy correlated with the number of attributes used.
To explore this line of reasoning the effects of habit and accountability on number of 
attributes used were subjected to two separate analyses of variance in which a hierarchi­
cal decomposition procedure was used. In this procedure, the subjects’ scores on the 
number of attributes used (i.e., significant beta weights) were first controlled for either 
the measure of consistency or equality. Subsequently, the effects of habit and account­
ability were tested.
After partialling out the consistency measure there was no longer a significant effect 
of Accountability on the (corrected) number of attributes used, F(l,77) =  2.63, ns, while 
the main effect of Habit and non-significant interaction were retained, F(l,77) =  7.59, 
p <0.01, and F(l,77) =  1.27, ns, respectively. This results suggests that the effect of 
accountability on the number of attributes used is produced by the increase in consis­
tency of information use.
Conversely, after controlling for the equality measure, the analysis revealed the 
opposite pattern. As anticipated, now the effect of Habit on the (corrected) number of 
attributes used was no longer significant, F(l,77) =  1.85, ns, whereas the main effect of 
Accountability and non-significant interaction were retained, F(l,77) =  5.78, p  < 0.02, 
and F(l,77) =  .36, ns, respectively, suggesting that the effect of habit on the number of 
attributes used is caused indeed by the decrease in the equality of allocation of 
importance to the attributes.
3.3, Outcome of decisional process: judgments of bicycle use
As can be seen in Table 1, the mean judgment of favorability across the 16 trips was 
6.17 ( s d =  1.62), indicating a moderate preference for the bike. Subjecting the means 
across the 16 judgments to a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) revealed that 
strong habit subjects judged the usefulness of bicycle slightly more favorable than weak 
habit subjects, F( 16,63), 1.73, p  <  0.07 (mean scores respectively 6.66 and 5.77). 
Hence, habit does affect decision outcome. There was no significant effect of Account­
ability, F( 16,63) =  0.90, ns, and no significant interaction, F( 16,63) “  0.41, ns.
4. Discussion
In line with other studies on habitual behaviors the results of the present study 
indicates that habit affects the elaborateness of decision making concerning travel mode 
use. In comparison to weak habit students, strong habit students used fewer attributes 
about the circumstances under which the trip had to be made. In addition, strong habit 
individuals were more selective in using the information of the attributes of choice 
options than weak habit individuals. These results suggest that habitual travel mode 
choices are based on a small subset of trip-related cues necessary to make these choices. 
Moreover, this finding may bear on the strategies individuals employed in trading off the 
attributes’ values. That is, when confronted with the goal to travel, strong habit persons 
tend to use heuristic and low effort strategies to arrive at decisions about using that
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mode, whereas weak habit persons seem to apply more complex and cognitively 
demanding strategies. More generally, habitual choices tend to follow cognitive short­
cuts.
In addition to the effects of habit, accountability led to a more effortful mode of 
processing during judgment: subjects who had to explain their judgments used more 
attributes and seemed to process the information more consistently than those who were 
not accountable. This is generally consistent with studies demonstrating that people 
expend more cognitive effort on judgments and decisions for which they feel personally 
accountable (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; McAllister et al., 1979; Tetlock, 1983; Weldon and 
Gargano, 1988).
Habit and accountability demands were both related to the depth o f  information 
processing, though their effects were independent. Specifically, accountability increased 
the number of attributes used by subjects as well as their consistency in using the 
information, whereas the latter effect was not obtained for habit strength. On the other 
hand, it was found that the equality of allocation of importance to trip-related cues and 
the decision outcome was affected by habit, but not by accountability. These results thus 
suggest that both factors affect the process of information use in different ways. It may 
be that accountable students anticipated that they had to inform the experimenter about 
their judgment strategy, e.g., which attributes were considered and how those attributes 
influenced their judgments. Hagafors and Brehmer (1983) argued that people usually 
lack insight into such judgment processes (see also Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). However, 
when asked to describe how they arrive at their judgments, judges may switch to more 
analytical strategies, i.e., a mode which is consistent and retrievable, irrespective of the 
strength of habits to come to such conclusions (cf. Tetlock, 1985). Hagafors and 
Brehmer (1983) showed that having to justify one’s judgment led to higher consistency 
in the use of information, which seems to have been the case in the present study as 
well. Whereas strong and weak habit subjects may have differed in the extensiveness of 
processing strategies, as has been argued before, the accountability manipulation may 
have motivated subjects to maintain consistency in their judgments. This line of 
argument was more or less supported by follow-up analyses.
In the present study, a policy capturing technique was used to establish, for each 
subject separately, how across 16 situations favorability judgments can be predicted on 
the basis of the 4 attributes of the travel situation. It may be argued that the 
within-subjects ratio o f observations (16) to predictors (4) may have been too low to 
expect reliable estimates of beta, as a result of which any habit or accountability effect 
on the use of information in judgment may also have been unreliable. It should be noted, 
however, that our main analysis does not use magnitude of betas per se, but their 
significant deviation from zero which as such is not subject to chance capitalization 
biases. More importantly, in all effects described the multiple regression parameters 
were subjected to ANOVA in between-subjects design. Hence, all reported effects may 
be scrutinized in terms of the suitability of the use of ANOVA, whilst the reliability of 
beta or multiple correlation estimates is immaterial in assessing the validity or reliability 
of the ANOVA results.
It should be noted that the present study focused on judgment, rather than choice. 
Although choice and judgment are often treated as equivalent, it has been argued that the
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psychological processes underlying choice and judgment may not be equal (e.g., 
Abelson and Levi, 1985; Billings and Scherer, 1988; Einhom and Hogarth, 1981). One 
point that may be particularly relevant for the present purpose is that judgment usually 
elicits a more deliberate mode of processing than choice, since judgment does not 
necessarily encourage subjects to use simplifying, heuristic strategies as may be often 
the case in a choice context. Therefore, judging the performance of a specific behavior 
may be less habitual than deciding to perform a specific course of action. In recent 
experiments (see, Verplanken et al., in press) we investigated the effects of habit on 
predecisional information search behavior in travel mode choice tasks. The results 
showed that, in comparison to weak habit persons, strong habit persons acquired less 
information about attributes of options as well as trip-related cues before they decided 
which travel mode to use. Thus, it appears that habit attenuates the elaborateness of 
information processing in both judgment and choice, suggesting that habit affects 
various parts or aspects of the decision process.
Another point that needs to be addressed is that, in the present study, the bicycle 
choice habit measure was only weakly related to favorability (or preference) ratings of 
bicycle use. However, it should be emphasized that the relationship between habit and 
favorability (or preference) should not be too strong (see also, e.g., Aarts, 1996, study 2; 
Verplanken et al., in press). That is, while favorability judgments and preferences 
usually cover the domain of reasoned thinking, habit strength is supposed to reflect 
much of the unreasoned, more or less automatic tendency to make choices or perform 
behaviors the way we did them in the past. Thus, habit should be distinguished from 
favorability (or preference) on both empirical and conceptual grounds. It is not implausi­
ble, though, that this past behavior as well as our current, habitual tendency to copy it, 
also contains a rudimentary component of what we explicitly prefer to do or tend to 
judge favorably (representing why we may have originally performed this behavior in 
the first place). The latter explains the low, sometimes significant, sometimes nonsignifi­
cant relationships observed between habit and favorability judgment (or preference).
Finally, in the present study we used an instrument to measure habit that relies on the 
assumption that habitual behavior is guided by automatically retrieved mental represen­
tations of past choices and actions in that behavioral domain (Bargh and Gollwitzer, 
1994). Moreover, the instrument assesses the extent to which habit is generalized, rather 
than a goal specific habit. The measure satisfied the criterion of both validity and 
reliability (Aarts, 1996). Yet, it may be worthwhile to elaborate somewhat on the 
question what it really means to have a ‘general habit’. First, general habit implies 
invariance of choices across situations within a behavioral domain: when general habit is 
strong the same behavioral option (e.g., bicycle) is chosen in quite different situations 
(e.g., travel goals), whereas a weak general habit may reveal in the use of multiple 
behavioral options in various situations. Secondly, it was found that general habit 
diminishes the need to explore the circumstances of the behavioral situation (e.g., 
traveling). Taken together then, when the habit of using a particular behavioral option is 
generalized, that behavioral option is capable of being activated immediately in the 
presence of a wide range of behavioral situations that are chronically encountered; and 
the decision to use this option can be made without pondering on the details of these 
situations. This may explain why subjects took the trip-related cues more equally into
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account (and thus used more cues) in the case of a weak (or absence of a) general habit, 
as they have to ‘discriminate’ more strongly between different travel purposes and 
circumstances to come to a choice than those indicating a strong general habit.
Of course, habitual behavior requires further study. First, the validity of the general­
ized measure of habit may be further established in for instance reaction time paradigms. 
It may be expected that habitual choices are more easily accessible and thus faster 
retrievable from memory. More importantly, further research should be conducted to 
shed more light onto the cognitive processes underlying habitual choices, particularly as 
regards how habitual behaviors are mentally represented and how these representations 
guide subsequent decisions.
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